SPEC.md section 8.
| Threat Vector | Mitigation Implemented |
|---|---|
| API Key Database Leak | Agent (hgk_) and Seller (hgs_) keys are hashed with HMAC-SHA256(KEY_PEPPER, fullKey) and verified with crypto.timingSafeEqual. Only a short prefix is stored in plaintext. |
| Signing Key Compromise at Rest | Ed25519 private keys in signing_keys are encrypted with AES-256-GCM using a random 96-bit IV and 32-byte MASTER_KEY. |
| Token Replay / Cross-Endpoint Substitution | Every Ed25519 JWS payment token (typ: "haggles-pay+jwt") binds sub (payment_id), aud (seller_id), mth (HTTP method), canonical url, amt (micro-dollars), and a 60-second exp. |
| Facilitator SSRF | The facilitator never makes outbound HTTP requests to seller URLs; URLs are validated and canonicalized purely as strings. |
| Portal CSRF & IDOR | hg_session (HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Lax) is paired with hg_csrf and a required X-Haggles-CSRF header + Origin check on all state-changing routes. Cross-tenant resource lookups return 404 not_found. |
| PayPal Webhook Spoofing | Raw webhook bodies are verified via PayPal’s POST /v1/notifications/verify-webhook-signature and deduplicated in webhook_events. |
| PayPal JS SDK XSS / CSP | Next.js 16 proxy.ts generates a per-response cryptographic nonce <N> and attaches a strict Content-Security-Policy with frame-ancestors 'none'. |